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Abstract
Why do businesses such as fast-food restaurants, co®ee shops, and hotels cluster?
In the classic analysis of Hotelling, ¯rms cluster to attract consumers who have travel
costs. We present an alternative model where ¯rms cluster because one ¯rm is free
riding on another's information about market demand. One consequence of this free
riding is that an informed ¯rm might forego a market that it knows to be pro¯table.
Furthermore, an uninformed ¯rm might earn higher pro¯ts when research costs are
high, because it can credibly commit to ignorance.
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1 Introduction
Why do businesses such as fast-food restaurants, co®ee shops, and hotels cluster? In the
classic analysis of Hotelling (1929), ¯rms cluster to attract consumers that want to minimize
travel costs when making a purchase. We present an alternative model where an informed
¯rm's entry into a market provides its rival with a noisy signal about market demand.
The uninformed rival will blindly mimic the informed leader when research costs are higher
than expected losses from sometimes following the leader into unpro¯table markets. One
consequence of this free riding is that an informed ¯rm might forego a market that it knows
to be pro¯table for only one ¯rm. Since the leader is avoiding markets that are pro¯table
for one ¯rm, the follower will sometimes enter when the leader does not. Furthermore, an
uninformed ¯rm's pro¯ts might be higher when research costs are higher, because it can
avoid the research cost knowing that it can blindly follow the informed ¯rm when it enters.
Hotelling (1929) provided valuable insight into the optimal strategies for pro¯t-maximizing
¯rms and vote-maximizing politicians. Hotelling's results have been described as \invalid,"
however, when ¯rms choose both price and location, because ¯rms have an incentive to move
apart to decrease price competition (D'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse, 1979). Hotelling
assumed that competitors set prices without reference to their rivals. Nevertheless, Hotelling
provided at least two important insights. First, spatial competition is inherently oligopolis-
tic, because ¯rms tend to compete directly with only a few neighbors. Second, businesses
tend to locate near rivals, despite price pressures.
Alternative explanations for ¯rm agglomeration can be categorized as demand side or sup-
ply side. On the demand side, ¯rms cluster because consumers prefer businesses in certain
locations. Firms cluster to attract consumers searching for optimal product characteristics
(Wolinsky, 1983; Fischer and Harrington, 1996; Konishi, 2005), to provide a credible com-
mitment to low prices (Dudey, 1990), to locate near consumers attracted by the marketing
3or reputation of rivals (Chung and Kalnins, 2001), and because consumers (residences, work-
places, or entertainment) are concentrated (Neven, 1986). On the supply side, ¯rms cluster
to decrease the costs of labor and other inputs (Marshall, 1920), to learn from other ¯rms
how to improve productivity (Glaeser et al., 1992; Shaver and Flyer, 2000; Furman et al.,
2006), and because spino®s sometimes locate near parent ¯rms (Buenstorf and Klepper,
2005; Klepper, 2007).1 Furthermore, ¯rms cluster when they are forced together by zoning
regulations (Ridley, Sloan, and Song, 2007).
Another explanation for agglomeration can be seen in the entry behavior of fast-food
restaurants and co®ee shops. Firms cluster because one ¯rm has better information and
its rival free rides. According to The Wall Street Journal, \In the past, many restau-
rants...plopped themselves next to a McDonald's to piggyback on the No. 1 burger chain's
market research"(Leung, 2003). Likewise, Browning and Zupan (2001) report that \After
McDonald's statistically determines that a location will be pro¯table and begins operations
on that site, Burger King opens up its own franchise nearby." Co®ee shops exhibit the same
behavior. \The Tully's goal is simple: a shop across the street from every Starbucks, around
the world"(Mulady, 2001). \The reason we want to open across the street from every Star-
bucks is they do a great job at ¯nding good locations," said Tom O'Keefe, Chairman and
CEO of Tully's Co®ee Corporation (Goll, 2000). According to data from Dun and Brad-
street, in California in 2004, the mean driving distance from a Tully's to a Starbucks was
0.6 miles, and 12 of 13 Tully's were located in the same zip code as a Starbucks.
The aforementioned behavior suggests a model of positive information externalities, such
as in the herding literature (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1998)
or in Caplin and Leahy (1994, 1998). In contrast to much of the herding literature which
assumes the follower's actions are neutral or helpful to the leader (e.g., a following investor
1Other studies focused not on geographic agglomeration, but temporal agglomeration of scheduled °ight
departure times (Borenstein and Netz, 1999) and movie release dates (Corts, 2001; Einav, 2007).
4bidding up the share price of a stock held by the leader), here the follower's free riding
hurts the leader. Stahl and Varaiya (1978), Gal-Or (1987), Hirokawa and Sasaki (2001),
and Toivanen and Waterson (2005) modeled both positive information externalities and the
adverse consequences for ¯rst movers. In these models, however, it is generally assumed
that information about demand is conferred by entry or by a rival's entry, and additional
information is in¯nitely costly. On the other hand, Cooper (1997) models optimal market
research by ¯rms and shows that in equilibrium only one ¯rm chooses to collect data, but
he does not model the entry decision. Our paper presents a model in which both entry and
research decisions are modeled for both the leader and follower.
Free riding based on entry information has both e±ciency and distributional conse-
quences. First, markets that can support only one ¯rm might not be entered by any ¯rms,
when the uninformed second mover's pro¯t-maximizing strategy is to always follow the ¯rst.2
Second, since the leader is avoiding markets that are pro¯table for one ¯rm, the follower will
sometimes enter when the leader does not. 3 Third, a ¯rm might earn higher pro¯ts when
research costs are high, because it can credibly commit to ignorance. If the second ¯rm's
research costs fall the ¯rst ¯rm can expect the second to be informed so the ¯rst can safely
enter markets that support only one ¯rm.Because free riding can lead to socially excessive
or insu±cient entry, the paper also relates to the literature on entry e±ciency (Mankiw and
Whinston, 1986).
2The model is motivated using examples of business clustering in local markets, but the model can be
applied to entry into global markets (such as developing nations) or even to children playing. Consider a
young child who wants to play with the same toy as an older child, not because sharing is fun, but because
the younger child believes that the older is more knowledgable about which toy is fun. The older child might
be wise to bypass toys that they cannot enjoy together such as a single doll. The older child might like to
¯nd a toy for which sharing is not entirely unpleasant such as a large set of Legos.
3Consider a small town in the state of Washington that does not have a Starbucks. Tully's knows the
town exists and that the town has no Starbucks, but Tully's doesn't know whether demand in the market
is small (not even enough demand for one chain co®ee shop) or medium (enough demand for only one chain
co®ee shop), because Tully's has not investigated demand (preferences, demographics, tra±c patterns) in
that town. If entry costs are low and research costs are high, Tully's might blindly enter the market, even
though it risks losses if the market is too small.
5Section 2 contains the basic model in which research is free for ¯rm 1 and in¯nitely costly
for ¯rm 2. In section 3 research is costly for both ¯rms. Section 4 contains the conclusion.
2 Basic Model
2.1 Set Up
Two ¯rms are considering entry into a market. Each ¯rm can open one or zero stores in
the market.4 Each knows that market demand µ is distributed F(µ);µ 2 [µ; ¹ µ]. Each decides
whether to enter a market with ai = 1 if ¯rm i enters and ai = 0 otherwise.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Firm 1 observes µ.
2. Firm 1 makes its entry decision.
3. Firm 2 observes ¯rm 1's entry decision and forms a belief about µ. Denote this belief
by the probability distribution ¹2(µ;a1) ¸ 0 where
R ¹ µ
µ ¹2(µ;a1)dµ = 1.
4. Firm 2 makes its entry decision.
Payo®s for each ¯rm depend on the ¯rm's entry decision, its rival's entry decision, and
market demand. Each ¯rm must pay entry cost K. After paying entry costs, the payo® for
¯rm i is ¼i(µ;aj), where aj is the action of the rival ¯rm. The following assumptions are
made regarding the payo® function:
Assumption 1 ¼i(µ;I) = ¼(µ;I), 8i and 8I 2 f0;1g.
4There are several reasons why a ¯rm might locate only one store in a market large enough to support
both the ¯rm and its rival. First, there might be lower demand for two stores of the same type than one store
of each type. Second, ¯rms might have diseconomies of scale. Third, ¯rms might be ¯nancially constrained.
Firms often prefer ¯nancing from internal retained earnings because the internal cost of capital is lower than
the market rate of interest or because they prefer secrecy. For a more extensive discussion of why ¯rms
might not open multiple stores in a market see Prescott and Visscher (1977).
6Assumption 2 If µ0 < µ then ¼(µ0;I) < ¼(µ;I) 8µ.
Assumption 3 ¼(µ;1) < ¼(µ;0) 8µ.
Assumption 4 There exists µ such that ¼(µ;1) > K and µ0 such that ¼(µ0;0) < K.
Assumption 1 establishes that the payo® functions are the same for both ¯rms. As-
sumption 2 establishes that the payo®s are monotonically increasing in market demand µ.
Assumption 3 establishes that the payo®s are higher if the rival ¯rm does not enter. As-
sumption 4 establishes the existence of some markets in which duopoly pro¯t is positive and
others in which monopoly pro¯t is negative. Given these assumptions, the market can be
divided into three regions.
Lemma 0. There exist values µd and µm such that:
a. For all µ < µd;¼(µ;1) < K and for all µ0 > µd;¼(µ;1) > K.
b. For all µ < µm;¼(µ;0) < K and for all µ0 > µm;¼(µ;0) > K.
c. µd > µm.
Markets are labeled large when duopoly pro¯t is positive, medium when monopoly pro¯t
is positive but duopoly pro¯t is negative, and small when duopoly and monopoly pro¯t is
negative. Firms without full information might enter small markets, but a fully-informed
pro¯t-maximizing ¯rm will never enter a market it knows to be small, so such strategies
for fully-informed ¯rms will be ignored. Large markets are pro¯table and small markets are
unpro¯table, regardless of whether a rival ¯rm enters. Hence, medium markets are the most
interesting.
The extensive form of the game is illustrated in Figure 1. Nature determines market size
µ which ¯rm 1 observes and then makes its entry decision. Firm 2 observes ¯rm 1's decision
to enter or not, but does not observe µ as indicated by the dotted curves connecting ¯rm 2's
nodes.
7Consider a simple example in which inverse demand is p = µ ¡ Q, µ is distributed
uniformly on [µ; ¹ µ], total output is the sum of the output from each ¯rm Q = q1 + q2, the
only cost is the entry cost K, and ¯rms compete a la Cournot. Hence, equilibrium duopoly
pro¯t is ¼i(µ;1)¡K = 1
9µ2 ¡K and equilibrium monopoly pro¯t is ¼i(µ;0)¡K = 1
4µ2 ¡K.
Figure 2 illustrates payo®s as a function of market size µ and whether the rival has entered
the market. In this ¯gure as in others, µ = 15 and ¹ µ = 100.
In the simple example, the value at which duopoly pro¯t is zero is µd = 3
p
K and the
value at which monopoly pro¯t is zero is µm = 2
p
K. Entry costs must be above K for
the existence of small markets (de¯ned as negative monopoly pro¯ts) and below K for the
existence of large markets (de¯ned as positive duopoly pro¯ts). Hence, the boundaries of
small, medium, and large markets are functions of K. With ¯xed values for µ and ¹ µ, increases
in K increase the space of small markets fastest (at a rate of 1=
p
K), medium markets grows
slowly (at a rate of 1=(2
p
K)), and large markets shrink (at a rate of 3=(2
p
K)). Hence,
when entry costs are high, more markets are small, for given values of µ and ¹ µ.
2.2 Equilibria when Leader's Research Is Free
With free research for the leader and in¯nitely costly research for the follower, there are
three lemmas. The notation is as follows: (¯rm 1's strategy, ¯rm 2's strategy given that
¯rm 1 enters, ¯rm 2's strategy given that ¯rm 1 does not enter). For example, (L;E;E)
in Lemma 1 below indicates that ¯rm 1 enters only large markets, if ¯rm 1 enters ¯rm 2
enters, and if ¯rm 1 does not enter ¯rm 2 still enters. While \L" indicates entry into only
large markets, \M" indicates entry into both medium and large markets (¯rms never forego
markets they know to be large).
In Lemma 1 below we ¯nd conditions such that ¯rms cluster in large markets but not
other markets. Entry cost is low, so ¯rm 2 always enters. Given that ¯rm 2 is always
entering, ¯rm 1 only enters markets large enough to support two ¯rms.
8Lemma 1 (L,E,E). There is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium where ¯rm 1 only enters
large markets and ¯rm 2 always enters if the following hold:
1a. K ·
F(µd)¡F(µm)
F(µd) E¼(µd > µ > µm;0) +
F(µm)
F(µd) E¼(µ < µm;0). (Converse of 2a.)
1b. K ·
1¡F(µd)
1¡F(µm)E¼(µ > µd;1) +
F(µd)¡F(µm)
1¡F(µm) E¼(µd > µ > µm;1). (Converse of 3a.)













F(µd) for µ < µd
0 otherwise
Proof of Lemma 1 (L,E,E). Consider ¯rm 2's best response. If ¯rm 1 enters, ¯rm 2 believes
the market is large so it will enter by Lemma 1. Condition 1b requires that expected duopoly
gains in large markets exceed duopoly losses in medium markets by more than the entry cost,
so ¯rm 2 will always follow ¯rm 1, even if ¯rm 1 is believed to enter both medium and large
markets. Consider ¯rm 1's best response. If ¯rm 2 always follows then ¯rm 1 only enters
large markets. Given that ¯rm 1 only enters large markets, if ¯rm 1 does not enter, ¯rm 2
believes the market is small or medium. Condition 1a states that expected monopoly gains
in medium markets exceed monopoly losses in small markets by more than the entry cost,
so ¯rm 2 also enters when ¯rm 1 does not enter.5
When entry costs rise, however, it is no longer pro¯table for ¯rm 2 to enter when ¯rm
1 does not enter, because losses in small markets become relatively greater than gains in
5It is assumed that ¯rm 2 believes that if ¯rm 1 is not present in a market it is because ¯rm 1 observed
market demand and chose not to enter. Alternatively, ¯rm 1 might not be aware of market demand or might
not even be aware that the market exists. Presumably, ¯rm 1 has not researched a market or is not aware
of it because it is on average smaller. The possibility that the market might be undiscovered terrain would
lower the threshold value of µ, but it would not change the qualitative results of the model.
9medium markets. Hence, ¯rm 2 only enters when ¯rm 1 enters. In Lemma 2 below we ¯nd
conditions such that sequential entry decisions can lead ¯rm 2 to mimic ¯rm 1.
Lemma 2. (L,E,N) There is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium where ¯rm 1 only enters
large markets and ¯rm 2 only enters if ¯rm 1 enters if the following conditions are met:
2a. K >
F(µd)¡F(µm)
F(µd) E¼(µd > µ > µm;0) +
F(µm)
F(µd) E¼(µ < µm;0). (Converse of 1a.)
2b. Same as condition 1b. (Converse of 3a.)
The beliefs that support this equilibrium are the same as in Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 2 (L,E,N). Consider ¯rm 2's best response. If ¯rm 1 enters, ¯rm 2 believes
the market is large so ¯rm 2 will enter. In fact, ¯rm 2 would enter even if it believed
the market was medium or large by condition 1b which requires that expected duopoly
gains in large markets exceed duopoly losses in medium markets by more than the entry
cost. Consider ¯rm 1's best response. If ¯rm 2 always follows then ¯rm 1 only enters large
markets. Given that ¯rm 1 only enters large markets, if ¯rm 1 does not enter, ¯rm 2 believes
the market must be small or medium. Condition 2a states that expected monopoly losses in
small markets plus monopoly gains in medium markets are less than entry costs (in contrast
to Lemma 1), so ¯rm 2 will not enter if ¯rm 1 does not enter.
Hence, ¯rm 1 foregoes medium markets because ¯rm 2 is following and medium markets
are not pro¯table for two ¯rms. This leads to a proposition.
Proposition 1. Under the conditions in Lemma 2 there are markets that are identi¯ed by
one ¯rm as pro¯table, but no ¯rms enter.
When entry costs are low, ¯rm 2 sometimes blindly follows ¯rm 1, leading ¯rm 1 to forego
markets that support only one ¯rm. When entry costs are high, however, ¯rm 1 knows that
10¯rm 2 will not ¯nd it pro¯table to blindly follow ¯rm 1 into medium and large markets. In
Lemma 3 below we ¯nd conditions such that the leader enters markets that are pro¯table
for at least one ¯rm (medium and large) while the other ¯rm never enters.
Lemma 3. (M,N,N) There is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where ¯rm 1 enters medium
or large markets and ¯rm 2 never enters if the following condition is met:
3a. K >
1¡F(µd)
1¡F(µm)E¼(µ > µd;1) +
F(µd)¡F(µm)
1¡F(µm) E¼(µd > µ > µm;1). (Converse of 1b.)













F(µm) for µ < µm
0 otherwise
(The beliefs di®er from Lemma 1 and 2 in that µm replaces µd.)
Proof of Lemma 3 (M,N,N). Consider ¯rm 2's best response. If ¯rm 1 enters, ¯rm 2 will
sustain losses by entering, because condition 3a ensures that expected duopoly gains in large
markets are less than duopoly losses in medium markets plus entry costs. Consider ¯rm 1's
best response. Since ¯rm 2 is not following, ¯rm 1 will enter medium and large markets. If
¯rm 1 does not enter, ¯rm 2 believes the market is small with negative payo®s, so it will not
enter.
Proposition 2. Given the parameter values of µ and K, there is a unique equilibrium char-
acterized by Lemmas 1-3.
11Using the conditions in Lemmas 1-3, it is straightforward to show that the equilibrium
is unique and has full coverage. For each condition in each lemma, there is a corresponding
converse in another lemma.
In summary, when ¯rm 1 is informed it avoids being the second ¯rm in unpro¯table
medium and small markets, so only large markets ever have two ¯rms. Firm 2, on the
other hand, is not informed if research costs are high, so pro¯table medium markets can be
foregone (L,E,N) and unpro¯table small markets can be entered (L,E,E).
2.3 Welfare and Pro¯t when Leader's Research Is Free
Entry costs a®ect social welfare and pro¯t directly through costs and indirectly through
¯rm strategies. Recall from the simple example that as entry costs increase, small markets
grow fastest, medium markets grow slowly, and large markets contract. If the entry costs
are low, K 2 (K;Ka), then ¯rm 2 will always enter and ¯rm 1 will enter only large markets
(L,E,E). If entry costs rise to K 2 (Ka;Kb) then the space of small markets becomes bigger
relative to the space of medium markets so ¯rm 2 does not enter when ¯rm 1 does not enter
(L,E,N). If the entry costs are high (K 2 (Kb;K)) then medium markets become greater
relative to large markets so ¯rm 2 changes to not enter when ¯rm 1 enters medium markets
(M,N,N). (Figure 3 illustrates both the boundaries described above and welfare described
below.)
Having examined how entry costs a®ect strategy, we can consider the implications for
social welfare. Social welfare losses result from 1) entry costs, 2) research costs (assumed
zero in section 2 but positive in section 3), 3) consumers unserved because no ¯rms enter
their market, and 4) consumers unserved because sales are limited by monopolists (and to a
lesser extent duopolists) in order to increase prices.
We can write expected social welfare as the sum of pro¯ts and consumer surplus. In the
simple linear example, pro¯t is p(µ;Q)Q less entry cost, and consumer surplus is (1=2)(µ ¡






dµ ¡ NkK (1)
where Nk 2 (0;1;2) is the number of ¯rms paying entry cost K.
The social optimum is never Lemma 2 (L,E,N), because medium markets are unserved.
Firm 1 avoids medium markets knowing that ¯rm 2 is free riding and that medium markets
are not pro¯table for two ¯rms. Lemma 2 (L,E,N) is socially inferior to Lemma 1 (L,E,E)
when entry costs are low (K < Ka) and socially inferior to Lemma 3 (M,N,N) when entry
costs are high (K > Ka) (Figure 3).
Likewise, pro¯t tends to be lower in Lemma 2 (L,E,N) since large markets have two
competitors and other markets are not entered. Pro¯t is higher in Lemma 3 (M,N,N),
because the leader earns monopoly pro¯ts. At high entry cost, the follower is deterred from
entering, thus securing monopoly pro¯ts for the leader and being socially optimal in that
redundant entry costs are avoided.
At higher entry costs (K > Ka), it is more pro¯table to be the leader. At lower entry
costs (K < Ka), there is a slight advantage to being the follower, because ¯rm 2 enters
medium and small markets, and the gains from medium markets exceed the losses from
small markets when entry costs are low (K < Ka).
3 Costly Research
3.1 Equilibria where Leader and Follower Research
Now assume that it costs Ri ¸ 0 for both ¯rms to obtain information about market
demand. Equilibria 1-3 are maintained, though with additional conditions (in the appendix).
For example, Lemma 2 (L,E,N) has six conditions illustrated in Figure 4. Furthermore, seven
13new lemmas are added as described below.
In Lemma 4 ¯rms cluster in large markets, and only ¯rm 1 enters medium markets,
because ¯rm 2 pays for research about market demand before following ¯rm 1. Firm 2
pays for research when ¯rm 1 enters, because ¯rm 1 not only enters large markets, but also
medium markets.
Lemma 4 (M,L,N). There is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where ¯rm 1 researches and
enters medium and large markets, ¯rm 2 researches then enters only large markets if ¯rm 1
enters, and ¯rm 2 does not enter if ¯rm 1 does not enter, if the following conditions hold:
4a. R2 ·
F(µm)¡F(µd)
1¡F(µm) [E¼(µd > µ > µm;1) ¡ K]. (Converse of 1c.)
4b. R2 ·
1¡F(µd)
1¡F(µm)[E¼(µ > µd;1) ¡ K]. (Converse of 3b.)
4c. Same as condition 3c (appendix). (Converse of 7d.)
4d. Same as condition 3d (appendix). (Converse of 10b.)
The beliefs that support this equilibrium are the same as in Lemma 3.
Proof of Lemma 4 (M,L,N). Consider ¯rm 2's best response. If ¯rm 1 enters, ¯rm 2 believes
that the market is medium or large. Firm 2 will research by condition 4a and only enter
large by condition 4b. If ¯rm 1 does not enter, ¯rm 2 believes the market is small, so it
neither enters nor conducts research. Consider ¯rm 1's best response. Firm 1 will research
and enter medium or large by conditions 3c and 4d. Firm 1 knows that ¯rm 2 will research
and only enter large markets when it enters, so ¯rm 1 can enter both medium and large
markets without fear of duopoly losses.
Although ¯rm 2 can now purchase information about market size, it will still free ride
under certain conditions. If ¯rm 1 enters only large markets, then ¯rm 2 can follow ¯rm 1
without purchasing information. Given ¯rm 1's strategy, if ¯rm 1 does not enter, then ¯rm
142 believes the market is medium or small. In this case, purchasing information might be
cost e®ective. In Lemma 5 ¯rm 2 free rides on ¯rm 1's information when ¯rm 1 enters, and
¯rm 2 purchases information when ¯rm 1 does not enter. Hence, the ¯rms cluster in large
markets, and only ¯rm 2 enters medium markets.
Lemma 5 (L,E,M). There is a perfect Bayesian equilbrium where ¯rm 1 researches and
enters large markets, ¯rm 2 enters blindly if ¯rm 1 enters, and ¯rm 2 researches and enters
medium if ¯rm 1 does not enter when the following hold:
5a. Same as condition 1b (appendix). (Converse of 3a.)
5b. Same as condition 1c (appendix). (Converse of 4a.)
5c. R2 ·
¡F(µm)
F(µd) [E¼(µ < µm;0) ¡ K]. (Converse of 1d.)
5d. R2 ·
F(µd)¡F(µm)
F(µd) [E¼(µd > µ > µm;0) ¡ K]. (Converse of 2d.)
5e. Same as condition 1e (appendix). (Converse of 8b for Ri = R1.)
5f. Same as condition 1f (appendix). (Converse of 6f.)
The beliefs that support this equilibrium are the same as in Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 5 (L,E,M). Consider ¯rm 2's best response. If ¯rm 1 enters, ¯rm 2 believes
the market is large and will enter blindly. Furthermore, conditions 1b and 1c ensure that
¯rm 2 enters even if ¯rm 1 enters medium or small. If ¯rm 1 does not enter, then ¯rm 2
believes the market is small or medium. Firm 2 will prefer to research and enter medium by
conditions 5c and 5d. Consider ¯rm 1's best response. Firm 1 will research and enter large
markets by conditions 1e and 1f. Firm 1 won't deviate to medium because of conditions 1b
and 1c which ensure that ¯rm 2 enters blindly regardless of ¯rm 1's strategy for medium
markets.
15Figure 5 summarizes the ¯rst ¯ve lemmas. These are the only lemmas under the special
case where research is free for ¯rm 1 and costly for ¯rm 2. Regions in the ¯gure are shaded
according to whether entry is \excessive" or \insu±cient." Entry is excessive in the sense
that ¯rms enter markets in which returns are less than entry costs, such as when the market
size is small but ¯rm 2 enters anyway, as in Lemma 1 (L,E,E). There is excess entry because
¯rm 2 is uninformed when research costs are high and entry costs are low (dark region).
When research and entry costs are both high there is \insu±cient" entry (lightly-shaded
region), in the sense that ¯rms forego markets in which returns exceed entry costs, such as
when ¯rm 1 foregoes medium markets, as in Lemma 2 (L,E,N).
When research costs are low, however, both ¯rms purchase research when it has positive
value. Research does not have positive value, for example, if your rival enters only large
markets and you observe your rival entering. For both Equilibria 4 and 5, there are two
¯rms in large markets, one ¯rm in medium markets, and no ¯rms in small markets.
Lemmas 4 and 5 are alike in that entry is neither excessive nor insu±cient, but there are
interesting distributional di®erences between them.
If research costs rise so that strategies change from Lemma 4 (M,L,N) to Lemma 5
(L,E,M), then ¯rm 2 bene¯ts at the expense of ¯rm 1. Firm 2's pro¯ts rise because now
¯rm 2 receives monopoly pro¯ts in medium markets rather than ¯rm 1. Furthermore, ¯rm
2 switches from researching when ¯rm 1 enters to researching when ¯rm 1 does not enter.
Proposition 3. When the follower's research costs rise, its pro¯t can rise too, because it
can credibly commit to free riding on its rival.
We can show that under the conditions for Lemma 5 (L,E,M), the expected pro¯t for ¯rm
2 from Lemma 5 is greater than the expected pro¯t for ¯rm 2 from Lemma 4 (M,L,N). The
former is E¦2
MLN = (1¡F(µd))(E¼(µ > µd;1)¡K¡R2)+(F(µd)¡F(µm))(¡R2)+F(µm)(0).
16The latter is E¦2
LEM = (1 ¡ F(µd))(E¼(µ > µd;1) ¡ K) + (F(µd) ¡ F(µm))(E¼(µd > µ >
µm;0) ¡ K ¡ R2) + F(µm)(¡R2). The di®erence in pro¯ts is E¦2
LEM ¡ E¦2
MLN = (F(µd) ¡
F(µm))(E¼(µd > µ > µm;0) ¡ K) ¡ R2F(µd) + R2(1 ¡ F(µm)). Clearly, the third term,
R2(1¡F(µm)), is positive. The sum of the ¯rst two terms is positive, too, by Condition 5d.
We examine the e®ect of research costs on pro¯t and social welfare in greater detail in
section 3.3.
3.2 Equilibria where Leader is Uninformed
We now consider lemmas in which ¯rm 1 is uninformed prior to entry because it chooses
not to pay research cost R1.
In Lemma 6 below ¯rm 1 does not enter and ¯rm 2 researches then enters medium and
large markets. Firm 1 does not enter, because if it did so ¯rm 2 would blindly follow.
Lemma 6 (N,E,M). There is an equilibrium where ¯rm 1 does not enter, ¯rm 2 enters if
¯rm 1 enters, and ¯rm 2 enters medium and large markets if ¯rm 1 does not enter if the
following conditions hold:
6a. R2 · ¡F(µm)[E¼(µ < µm;0) ¡ K]. (Converse of 7d for Ri = R2.)
6b. R2 · [1¡F(µd)][E¼(µ > µd;0)+(F(µd)¡F(µm))[E¼(µd > µ > µm;0)¡K]. (Converse
of 10b for Ri = R2.)
6c. Same as condition 1b (appendix). (Converse of 3a.)
6d. Same as condition 1c (appendix). (Converse of 4a.)
6e. Same as condition 1e (appendix). (Converse of 8b for Ri = R1.)
6f. R1 > [1 ¡ F(µd)][E¼(µ > µd;1) ¡ K]. (Converse of 1f.)






1¡F(µd) for µ > µd
0 otherwise
¹2(µ;0) = f(µ)8µ
Proof of Lemma 6 (N,E,M). Consider ¯rm 2's best response. If ¯rm 1 does not enter and is
uninformed, then ¯rm 2 will do research and enter medium and large markets by conditions
6a and 6b. If ¯rm 1 is informed and enters, then ¯rm 2 will enter by conditions 1b and 1c,
even if ¯rm 1 is entering medium as well as large markets. Consider ¯rm 1. Firm 1 prefers
to research and enter large markets rather than entering blindly by condition 1e. Firm 1
does not enter medium markets since ¯rm 2 will always follow ¯rm 1 when ¯rm 1 enters
by conditions 1b and 1c. Hence, if ¯rm 1 enters it will research ¯rst and enter only large
markets, consistent with ¯rm 2's beliefs. Firm 1 prefers, however, to not enter rather by
condition 6f.
In Lemma 7 below ¯rms cluster in large markets, and only ¯rm 1 enters medium markets,
because ¯rm 2 pays for research about market demand before following ¯rm 1. Firm 2 pays
for research when ¯rm 1 enters, because ¯rm 1 not only enters large markets, but also
medium and even small markets where ¯rm 1 sustains losses.
Lemma 7 (E,L,E). There is an equilibrium where ¯rm 1 enters without research, ¯rm 2
researches and enters large markets if ¯rm 1 enters, and ¯rm 2 enters if ¯rm 1 does not
enter if the following conditions hold:
7a. Same as condition 4a. (Converse of 1c.)
7b. R2 · [F(µm)¡F(µd)][E¼(µd > µ > µm;1)¡K]¡F(µm)[E¼(µ < µm;1)¡K]. (Converse
of 8b for Ri = R2.)
187c. R2 · [1 ¡ F(µd)][E¼(µ > µd;1) ¡ K]. (Converse of 9c.)
7d. Ri > ¡F(µm)[E¼(µ < µm;0) ¡ K]8i. (Converse of 3c for Ri = R1 and 6a Ri = R2.)
The beliefs that support this equilibrium are ¹2(µ;1) = ¹2(µ;0) = f(µ) 8µ.
Proof of Lemma 7 (E,L,E). Consider ¯rm 2's best response. If ¯rm 1 enters without being
informed, ¯rm 2 believes the market o®ers duopoly pro¯ts in small, medium, or large markets.
Firm 2 prefers to research and enter large markets by conditions 7b and 7c. Conditions 4a and
7c ensure that ¯rm 2 researches then enters large markets, even if ¯rm 1 researches and enters
medium markets. If a ¯rm has no information and expects to be a monopolist in medium
markets, as is the case for ¯rm 1 and for ¯rm 2 when ¯rm 1 is out, then the ¯rm prefers to
enter without information by conditions 7c and 7d. Note that by combining 7c and 7d we get
K · [1¡F(µd)]E¼(µ > µd;1)+[F(µd)¡F(µm)]E¼(µd > µ > µm;0)+F(µm)E¼(µm > µ;0).
In the previous seven lemmas, at least one ¯rm has been informed of market demand
prior to entering. Research can, however, be so costly that no ¯rms are informed, as in
Equilibria 8-10 (appendix). In Lemma 8 both ¯rms always enter without ¯rst conducting
research (E,E,E). In Lemma 9 there is a monopolist and neither ¯rm is informed before
entering (E,N,E). In Lemma 10 research and entry costs are so high that no ¯rms enter
(N,N,N).
Proposition 4. Given the parameter values of µ, K, and R1 = R2, there is a unique
equilibrium characterized by Lemmas 1-10.
Using the conditions in Lemmas 1-10, it is straightforward to show that the equilibrium
is unique and has full coverage. For each condition in each lemma, there is a corresponding
converse in another lemma. The equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 6. When research costs
are high and entry costs are low, ¯rms sometimes enter markets in which returns do not
19cover the entry costs (dark shade). When research costs and entry costs are both high,
¯rms sometimes forego markets in which returns would cover entry costs (light shade). For
example, in Lemma 9 (E,N,E) only one ¯rm enters, even though large markets are pro¯table
for two.
3.3 Welfare and Pro¯t when Research Is Costly
Recall that welfare losses result from 1) entry costs, 2) research costs, 3) consumers
unserved because no ¯rms enter their market, and 4) consumers unserved because sales are
limited by monopolists (and to a lesser extent duopolists) in order to increase prices. In
section 2.3 we focused on the e®ect of entry costs on welfare. Here we focus on the e®ect of






dµ ¡ NkK ¡ NrR (2)
where Nr 2 (0;1;2) is the number of ¯rms paying the research cost R.
Figure 7 illustrates the e®ect on social welfare and expected pro¯ts of changes in research
costs. Entry costs are ¯xed (using the simple example with K = 400). When research costs
are low, ¯rm 1 enters medium markets and ¯rm 2 researches before following (M;L;N).
Consistent with Proposition 3, when ¯rm 2's research costs are lower, ¯rm 2's pro¯ts are
lower, because ¯rm 2 can no longer credibly commit to ignorance and thus can no longer
free ride on ¯rm 1.
When research costs (and ¯xed entry costs) are moderate, ¯rm 2 strictly follows ¯rm 1
(L;E;N). Consistent with Proposition 1, medium markets are not entered by either. This
free riding leads to lower social welfare. Furthermore, ¯rm 2's pro¯ts exceed ¯rm 1's pro¯ts.
When research costs are high, neither ¯rm purchases information (E;E;E). Hence,
welfare and pro¯t functions are horizontal because further increases in research costs a®ect
20neither ¯rm.
4 Conclusion
The classic explanation for agglomeration o®ered by Hotelling is that ¯rms locate near one
another because they believe that they will attract all consumers located on their side. An
alternative explanation is that ¯rms cluster because one ¯rm is free riding on the information
of another.
Entry into a market by an informed ¯rm provides its rival with a noisy signal about
market demand. This is similar to the result from the literature on herd behavior, except
that the ¯rst ¯rm is harmed by the entry of the second. Hence, the ¯rst ¯rm must account
for the reaction of its rival when it decides whether to enter a market. The ¯rst ¯rm might
forego a market that it knows to be pro¯table.
Due to advances in technology, information has become less costly to obtain in recent
years. The model predicts that there will be less free-riding behavior. This is not necessarily
bene¯cial to all ¯rms, however, as the second ¯rm can no longer credibly commit to ignorance.
If the second ¯rm is informed, it will not follow the ¯rst ¯rm into markets that support only
one ¯rm. Hence, the ¯rst ¯rm can capture markets that support only one ¯rm, rather than
having those captured by its rival.
215 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 0. First consider Lemma 0a. By Assumption 4 there exists some µ < µd
such that ¼(µ;0) < 0 and by Assumption 3 ¼(µ;1) < ¼(µ;0), so ¼(µ;1) < ¼(µ;0) < 0.
Likewise, by Assumption 4 there exists some µ > µd such that ¼(µ;1) > 0. By Assumption
2, there exists some µd such that Lemma 0a holds. Likewise, by Assumption 4 there exists
some µ > µd such that ¼(µ;1) > 0. By Assumption 2, there exists some µd such that
Lemma 0a holds. Second consider Lemma 0b. By Assumption 3 ¼(µ;1) < ¼(µ;0) 8µ and
by Assumption 4 there exists some µ such that ¼(µ;1) > 0, so there exists some µ such that
¼(µ;0) > ¼(µ;1) > 0. Likewise, by Assumption 4 there exists some µ such that ¼(µ;0) < 0.
By Assumption 2, there exists some µm such that Lemma 0b holds. Third consider Lemma
0c. If µm > µ0 > µd then by Lemma 0a ¼(µ0;1) > 0 and by Lemma 0b ¼(µ0;0) < 0. Hence,
¼(µ0;1) > 0 > ¼(µ0;0), but by Assumption 3 ¼(µ0;1) < ¼(µ0;0). This is a contradiction so it
is not the case that µm > µ0 > µd. Likewise, µm = µd would lead to a contradiction because
it would require that ¼(µ;0) = ¼(µ;1). Consider instead if µm < µ0 < µd then by Lemma
0a ¼(µ0;1) < K and by Lemma 0b ¼(µ0;0) > K. Hence, ¼(µ0;1) < K < ¼(µ0;0) which
corresponds with Assumption 3 ¼(µ0;1) < ¼(µ0;0).
Equilibria 1-3 are the same as in section 2 except new conditions are added to examine
cases in which Ri ¸ 0.
Lemma 1 (L,E,E). There is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium where ¯rm 1 researches
and only enters large markets and ¯rm 2 always enters if the following hold:
1a. K ·
F(µd)¡F(µm)
F(µd) E¼(µd > µ > µm;0) +
F(µm)
F(µd) E¼(µ < µm;0). (Converse of 2a.)
1b. K ·
1¡F(µd)
1¡F(µm)E¼(µ > µd;1) +
F(µd)¡F(µm)
1¡F(µm) E¼(µd > µ > µm;1). (Converse of 3a.)
1c. R2 >
F(µm)¡F(µd)
1¡F(µm) [E¼(µd > µ > µm;1) ¡ K]. (Converse of 4a.)
221d. R2 >
¡F(µm)
F(µd) [E¼(µ < µm;0) ¡ K]. (Converse of 5c.)
1e. R1 · [F(µm)¡F(µd)][E¼(µd > µ > µm;1)¡K]¡F(µm)[E¼(µ < µm;1)¡K]. (Converse
of 8b for Ri = R1.)
1f. R1 · [1 ¡ F(µd)][E¼(µ > µd;1) ¡ K]. (Converse of 6f.)













F(µd) for µ < µd
0 otherwise
Proof of Lemma 1 (L,E,E). Consider ¯rm 2's best response. If ¯rm 1 enters, it believes the
market is large so it will enter by lemma 1. Conditions 1b and 1c ensure that ¯rm 2 enters
blindly even if ¯rm 1 enters medium and large. If ¯rm 1 does not enter, ¯rm 2 believes the
market is medium or small. It will decide to enter without research if 1a and 1d hold because
gains from a medium monopoly are expected to be positive. Consider ¯rm 1's best response.
Firm 1 is aware of beliefs and strategy for ¯rm 2. Since ¯rm 2 always enters blindly, ¯rm 1's
best response is to research and only enter large by 1e and 1f. Medium will bring in losses
and not entering forfeits pro¯ts.
Lemma 2 (L,E,N). There is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium where ¯rm 1 researches




F(µd) E¼(µd > µ > µm;0) +
F(µm)
F(µd) E¼(µ < µm;0). (Converse of 1a.)
2b. Same as condition 1b. (Converse of 3a.)
232c. Same as condition 1c. (Converse of 4a.)
2d. R2 >
F(µd)¡F(µm)
F(µd) [E¼(µd > µ > µm;0) ¡ K]. (Converse of 5d.)
2e. Same as condition 1e. (Converse of 8b for Ri = R1.)
2f. Same as condition 1f. (Converse of 6f.)













F(µd) for µ < µd
0 otherwise
Proof of Lemma 2 (L,E,N). Consider ¯rm 2's best response. If ¯rm 1 enters it believes the
market is large, so it will enter by lemma 1. Conditions 1b and 1c ensure that the ¯rm enters
blindly even if ¯rm 1 enters medium and large. If ¯rm 1 does not enter, ¯rm 2 believes the
market is medium or small. It will decide to not enter and research by conditions 2a and 2d.
Consider ¯rm 1's best response. Conditions 1e and 1f ensure that it wants to do research
and enter large markets. Given the beliefs and strategy of ¯rm 2, ¯rm 1 will have to enter
only large markets (it can't deviate to medium and large because 2 enters blindly).
Lemma 3 (M,N,N). There is an equilibrium where ¯rm 1 researches and enters medium
and large markets, and ¯rm 2 never researches or enters, if the following hold:
3a. K >
1¡F(µd)
1¡F(µm)E¼(µ > µd;1) +
F(µd)¡F(µm)
1¡F(µm) E¼(µd > µ > µm;1). (Converse of 1b.)
3b. R2 >
1¡F(µd)
1¡F(µm)[E¼(µ > µd;1) ¡ K]. (Converse of 4b.)
3c. R1 · ¡F(µm)[E¼(µ < µm;0) ¡ K]. (Converse of 7d for Ri = R1.)
243d. R1 · [1 ¡ F(µd)][E¼(µ > µd;0) ¡ K] + [F(µd) ¡ F(µm)][E¼(µd > µ > µm;0) ¡ K].
(Converse of 10b.)













F(µm) for µ < µm
0 otherwise
Proof of Lemma 3 (M,N,N). Consider ¯rm 2's best response. If ¯rm 1 enters, condition 3a
ensures that ¯rm 2 does not enter the market blindly. Furthermore, condition 3b ensures
that there is no bene¯t from researching and entering a large duopoly market. If ¯rm 1
does not enter, then ¯rm 2 believes that the market is small and will decide not to enter by
lemma 1. Consider ¯rm 1's best response. Since ¯rm 2 is not entering, ¯rm 1 will research
and enter by 3c and 3d above. It will always enter medium or large because it will have a
monopoly in both which implies positive pro¯ts. Switching from this strategy would result
in negative or forfeited pro¯ts.
In Equilibria 8-10, research costs are su±ciently high that neither ¯rm is informed of
market demand before entering.
Lemma 8 (E,E,E). There is an equilibrium where ¯rm 1 enters without research and ¯rm
2 always enters if the following hold:
8a. K · [1 ¡ F(µd)][E¼(µ > µd;1)] + [F(µd) ¡ F(µm)][E¼(µd > µ > µm;1)] + F(µm)E¼(µ <
µm;1). (Converse of 9b.)
8b. Ri > [F(µm)¡F(µd)][E¼(µd > µ > µm;1)¡K]¡F(µm)[E¼(µm > µ;1)¡K]8i. (Converse
of 1e for Ri = R1 and 7b for Ri = R2.)
25The beliefs that support this equilibrium are ¹2(µ;1) = ¹2(µ;0) = f(µ) 8µ.
Proof of Lemma 8 (E,E,E). Consider ¯rm 2's best response. Firm 2 believes that ¯rm 1's
actions provide no new information because ¯rm 1 is uninformed by condition 8b. If ¯rm 1
enters, ¯rm 2 enters because expected duopoly pro¯ts across all market sizes are positive by
condition 8a and research is too costly by condition 8b. Likewise, if ¯rm 1 does not enter,
¯rm 2 ¯nds it more pro¯table to enter; obviously if duopoly pro¯t is high, then monopoly
pro¯ts must be even higher. Finally, it follows that ¯rm 1's pro¯t-maximizing strategy is to
enter by the same conditions 8a and 8b.
Lemma 9 (E,N,E). There is an equilibrium where ¯rm 1 enters, ¯rm 2 does not enter when
¯rm 1 enters, and ¯rm 2 enters when ¯rm 1 does not enter if the following conditions hold:
9a. K · [1 ¡ F(µd)]E¼(µ > µd;0) + [F(µd) ¡ F(µm)]E¼(µd > µ > µm;0) + F(µm)E¼(µm >
µ;0). (Converse of 10a.)
9b. K > [1 ¡ F(µd)]E¼(µ > µd;1) + [F(µd) ¡ F(µm)]E¼(µd > µ > µm;1) + F(µm)E¼(µ <
µm;1). (Converse of 8a.)
9c. R2 > [1 ¡ F(µd)][E¼(µ > µd;1) ¡ K]. (Converse of 7c.)
9d. Same as condition 7e. (Converse of 3c for Ri = R1 and 6a for Ri = R2.)
The beliefs that support this equilibrium are ¹2(µ;1) = ¹2(µ;0) = f(µ) 8µ.
Proof of Lemma 9 (E,N,E). Consider ¯rm 2's best response. If ¯rm 1 enters blindly, then
¯rm 2 will prefer to stay out by conditions 9b and 9c. If ¯rm 1 does not enter and is
uninformed, then ¯rm 2 will prefer to enter blindly by conditions 9a and 9d. Given that
¯rm 2 does not follow, ¯rm 1 enters blindly by conditions 9a and 9d.
Lemma 10 (N,N,N). There is an equilibrium where neither ¯rm 1 nor ¯rm 2 enter if the
following conditions hold:
2610a. K > [1 ¡ F(µd)]E¼(µ > µd;0) + [F(µd) ¡ F(µm)]E¼(µd > µ > µm;0) + F(µm)E¼(µm >
µ;0). (Converse of 9a.)
10b. Ri > [1 ¡ F(µd)][E¼(µ > µd;0) ¡ K] + [F(µd) ¡ F(µm)][E¼(µd > µ > µm;0) ¡ K].
(Converse of 6b when Ri = R2.)
The beliefs that support this equilibrium are ¹2(µ;1) = ¹2(µ;0) = f(µ)8µ.
Proof of Lemma 10 (N,N,N). Consider ¯rm 2's best response. If ¯rm 1 enters or does not
enter, ¯rm 2 does not enter by condition 10a and does not research by condition 10b. Firm
1's entry provides no information since ¯rm 1 is uninformed, except converting the market
from monopoly to duopoly. Whether the market is monopoly or duopoly, entry and research
are so costly as to make expected returns negative. Likewise, entry and research are not
expected to be pro¯table by ¯rm 1 due to conditions 10a and 10b respectively.
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(π(θ,1) − K,π(θ,1) − K)
Figure 1: Extensive form of the game when research about market size µ is free for the leader








Figure 2: Monopoly and duopoly pro¯t as a function of market size µ where small, medium,
and large markets support 0, 1, and 2 ¯rms respectively.














Figure 3: Social welfareW and expected pro¯t E¦i for ¯rm i depend on the entry cost K
and ¯rm strategies. In this example, research is free for ¯rm 1 and in¯nitely costly for ¯rm
2.
33Lemma 2 (L,E,N)
K = 450, Ri = 200, µ = 15, ¹ µ = 100
2a. Expected monopoly pro¯ts are
negative when markets are small or
medium
1b. Expected duopoly pro¯ts are














1c. Research costs exceed expected
duopoly losses in medium markets
2d. Research costs exceed expected















1e. Expected duopoly losses in
small and medium markets exceed
research costs
1f. Expected duopoly gains in large















Figure 4: Pro¯t is a function of market size µ, entry cost K, research cost Ri, and whether the
rival entered the market. This example illustrates the six conditions for Lemma 2 (L,E,N).














Figure 5: When ¯rm 2's research cost (R2 > R1 = 0) is high and entry cost K is low,
¯rms sometimes enter markets in which returns do not cover entry cost (dark shade). When
research and entry costs are both high, ¯rms sometimes forego markets in which returns
would cover entry cost (light shade).



























Figure 6: When research cost Ri is high and entry cost K is low, ¯rms sometimes enter
markets in which returns do not cover entry costs (dark shade). When research and entry
















Figure 7: Social welfare W and expected pro¯t E¦i for ¯rm i depend on the research cost
R1 = R2 and ¯rms' strategies. Entry cost K is ¯xed.
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